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ABSTRACT
The Mental Organization of People’s Permanent and Situational Attributes
By
Kathleen G. Larson
Dr. David E. Copeland, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

This thesis investigated whether readers would integrate physical descriptions of
characters into one coherent mental representation or if they would keep mental
representations separate. The integration of multiple concepts has been examined in the
context of the fan effect, which is the finding that an increase in the number of learned
associations for a concept can result in an increase in retrieval times and error rates
(Anderson, 1974). However, there is typically not a fan effect when people are able to
organize the related information into a single integrated situation model (Radvansky &
Zacks, 1991). Previous studies investigating the fan effect have focused on objects and
locations, but few studies have examined how people organize physical traits about
individuals. Thus, the current experiments examined whether situational (i.e., temporary,
or based on the situation) and permanent physical attributes from multiple sentences are
stored separately or can be integrated, and this was examined in the context of predictions
made by situation model theory (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991; Radvansky, Spieler, &
Zacks, 1993) and ACT-R theory (Anderson & Reder, 1999). Consistent with situation
model theory, all experiments showed evidence of a differential fan effect, however, in
some cases, integration did not occur in patterns that were predicted by situation model
theory. Other explanations for the pattern of results are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you were at a wedding reception and you met a woman who was
wearing a cocktail dress, a pearl necklace, and high heels. You also met three groomsmen
who were all wearing red bowties. If, later, you were asked about these guests, would it
be easier to recall who were wearing red bowties or what the woman was wearing? Or
would they be similarly difficult to recall? One possibility is that it would be easier to
recall what the woman was wearing because people can integrate the attributes into a
single mental representation. Another possibility, that they would be similarly difficult to
recall, could be due to the fact that both scenarios consist of multiple associations
connected with one concept. The fan effect (Anderson, 1974) is a finding that when there
are more facts learned about a concept, it can take longer (and there can be more errors)
when retrieving specific facts related to that concept. The focus of this thesis was to
explore how people organize fictional characters’ physical attributes in memory and what
factors influence that process. Specifically, I examined whether people integrate character
attributes into a single representation or maintain them in separate representations. In
addition, this study examined whether this organization is affected by the type of attribute
(permanent or situational), whether attributes conflict with one another, the description of
spatial locations, and the use of internal attributes (i.e., emotional state).
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The Fan Effect
The fan effect (Anderson, 1974) is a classic finding that an increase in the number
of newly learned associations for a concept can result in an increase in retrieval times and
error rates. The basic paradigm involves remembering people or objects paired with a
location. Participants typically study approximately 15-30 sentences and these sentences
consist of fan levels of one, two, or three. The term fan refers to the number of facts
studied about a particular concept. Consider the following example, “The hippie is at the
park,” “The hippie is at the café,” and “The hippie is at the library;” here, the concept is
the hippie and there is a fan of three because people are remembering three facts about
that person. The next phase is to test whether readers committed these facts to memory.
The verification of encoding is usually achieved by asking questions like “Who is in the
park?” and “Where is the hippie?” Participants will study those facts and answer these
questions until they get a perfect score twice. Finally, participants take a recognition test
where they confirm whether sentences were studied or not. Typically, people show longer
retrieval times and higher error rates when there are more facts associated with a concept;
that is, performance is worse when there is a larger fan level.
Thus, in the fan effect paradigm, there appears to be a cost to learning more
information. On a basic level, this cost is thought to be a result of interference; the ideas
associated around the same concept interfere with one another, resulting in longer
response times and higher error rates. At this point, it is important to note that while the
fan effect has been demonstrated in many research studies, an increase in response times
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and error rates are not always observed when multiple facts are associated with a concept
(e.g., Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). These exceptions are explored in more detail later, in
the context of the two major theories that have been used to explain the fan effect: (1) the
Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R, Anderson & Reder, 1999) and (2)
Situation Model Theory (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). The following sections explore
these theories.
Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational (ACT-R)
The results of the fan effect studies have been explained by some researchers in
terms of the Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational (ACT-R) model (previously coined
ACT) and, according to this model, information is structured in memory as nodes and
links (Anderson & Reder, 1999). The nodes are the concepts and the links are the
associations. The fan effect occurs because several of the links have to be activated when
a node has associations to other nodes and this activation of several nodes causes a
slowdown in response times and more errors. For example, when presented with “The
hippie is at the park,” the nodes of café and library will automatically be activated as
well, causing a person to search those associations in memory before verifying if the
statement was previously studied.
ACT-R theory is based on a multiple access retrieval model. In this model, people
use both serial and parallel search processes when verifying whether a sentence is in
memory. More specifically, when presented with a sentence, for serial processing a
person has to search all ideas associated with one particular concept from that sentence in
a sequential order. For instance, participants presented with “The hippie is at the park”
also have to mentally search through “The hippie is at the café” and “The hippie is at the
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library”. The greater number of items to search leads to the increase in response times
that is typically found in fan effect paradigms. In addition, it is explained that parallel
processing occurs in that people can conduct a similar serial search for a different concept
from the sentence; in this example, a person would, in parallel, conduct serial searches
for ideas related to hippie and ideas related to park.
Situation Model Theory
Overview of Situation Model Theory
After people read text, they could remember the words that were presented or they
could remember what the text was about (or both). Situation models (also called mental
models) are mental representations that people form of the situation the text describes
rather than the text itself (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). A situation
model is essentially a mental simulation of a real or possible world described by the text.
For instance, if people read the sentence, “Michelle and Dan met at a steakhouse,” the
situation model may include inferences such as, “Michelle and Dan had dinner” or
“Michelle and Dan were on a date.” This representation is clearly an elaborated version
of the original description that is based on some combination of prior knowledge,
expectations, inferences, or other contextual information. In this case, prior knowledge of
why two people meet at a steakhouse can be used to make inferences.
The situation model level is considered the highest level of mental representation
because it includes integrated ideas as well as inferences that can be based on prior
knowledge, what was mentioned earlier, or what is expected to be mentioned later.
However, cognitive psychologists still believe that people can create mental
representations of the text itself (e.g., Schmalhofer & Glavanov, 1986). Readers create a
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surface level, which is the actual text that was presented, such as remembering the exact
words, “Michelle and Dan met at a steakhouse.” In addition, people also create a
propositional textbase, which is memory for the idea, regardless of what words are used
to express it. For example, someone’s textbase representation of that sentence could be,
“Dan and Michelle got together at a steakhouse.” Here, the same idea is being expressed,
but different words (e.g., synonyms) and ordering of the words can be used. An important
difference between the situation model level and the other levels, the surface and textbase
levels, is that the latter two consist of separately stored representations while the former
can consist of integrated representations.
When discussing situation models, it is important to note what distinguishes them
from schemata. As described earlier, a situation model is a mental representation of a
specific situation; in contrast, schemata are mental representations of stereotypical
situations (Alba & Hasher, 1983). One common type of schema is a script, which
contains information about events that are frequently experienced (Schank & Abelson,
1977), and a classic example is the restaurant script. When a person goes to a restaurant,
there are usually always the same props (e.g., table, food, etc.), roles (e.g., waiter), scenes
(e.g., ordering), and typical order of events (e.g., reading a menu before ordering). There
appears to be script norms in that people largely agree on the general components of
scripts (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979). The distinction between situation models and
scripts can appear fuzzy but, essentially, schemata are the building blocks for situation
models (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). When people construct a situation model for a
specific situation, they will often retrieve information from scripts they have created
through past experience to use as a foundation for their situation model representation.
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Situation models are a crucial element in language comprehension because they
help people integrate information across sentences to form a coherent understanding of
what they read (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Otherwise, people would store things in
separate chunks. Situation models are also needed at a larger level for when someone is
learning about a domain from multiple sources (Perfetti, Britt, & Georgi, 1995). For
example, someone writing a thesis in a particular area would need a situation model to
integrate the information. Situation models also help people integrate information from
multiple modalities (Baggett, 1979). For example, someone could integrate what they
saw on a television news show with information from a news article that they read.
The process of constructing a situation model involves three essential
components: (1) the current model, (2) the integrated model, and (3) the complete model
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The current model is the model that a reader creates
sentence by sentence (or clause by clause) while reading the text. The integrated model is
an online process where they connect each clause or sentence together to form a more
coherent model. Finally, the complete model is the model a reader constructs after
reading a story and is the model that gets stored into long-term memory.
The process of connecting the current model into the integrated model is referred
to as updating. Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) proposed that this process happens by
forming links between the current model and the integrated model, which is stored in
long-term memory. Long-term memory can be used as an extension of working memory,
which is made possible for highly practiced activities like language comprehension. In
the context of text processing, readers keep the integrated model in long-term memory
while simultaneously constructing the current model in working memory. Basically, the

6

integrated model in long-term memory is a cumulative record of the events, and the
current model in working memory consists of what is currently foregrounded; that is,
what is currently in focus or part of the current event. The information that is deemed
relevant can be based on world knowledge (Zwaan, 1994) or linguistic cues in the text
(Gernsbacher, 1990; Givon; 1992).
Situation models are multifaceted because readers monitor several aspects of
events during text comprehension and this view has been coined the event indexing model
(Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). This model suggests that readers monitor five
dimensions simultaneously: time (when the described events take place), causality (what
caused certain events to take place), intention (goals that characters are pursuing), space
(where people and objects are located), and character/entity. These dimensions are the
building blocks that people will combine to form an integrated whole of what they read.
For example, someone might read a story and form a situation model about how
yesterday (time), Andrea (character), a fiery redhead (attributes of Andrea), walked into
her boss’s office (space) and asked for a promotion (intentionally) because she felt that
her responsibilities exceeded those listed on her job description (causation).
Situation Model Theory and the Fan Effect
Radvansky and Zacks (1991) applied the idea of integrating common elements of
a single situation to the fan effect. For instance, when people are presented with facts,
such as “The desk is in the office,” “The desk is in the hotel,” and “The desk is in the
library,” people will demonstrate the traditional fan effect. In this example, the fact that
the desk is associated with three different locations creates a fan of three. In contrast, if
presented with the following facts, “The desk is in the office,” “The phone is in the
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office,” and “The plant is in the office,” people will retrieve those facts faster than in the
former case. These results were explained in terms of situation models where people will
create three separate situation models when given three locations (e.g., office, hotel, and
library). However when presented with one location (e.g., office), people will integrate
the ideas into one situation model based on that spatial location.
The Radvansky and Zacks (1991) study was partially based on the idea that
people regularly integrate common ideas that are learned. For example, earlier work by
Bransford and Franks (1971, 1972) had participants study sentences describing four
different ideas about one topic, such as, “The ants were in the kitchen,” “The ants ate the
jelly,” “The jelly was sweet,” “The jelly was on the table.” During a recognition test,
participants would falsely recognize an integrated idea that was never presented during
study (e.g., “The ants in the kitchen ate the sweet jelly that was on the table”). This
finding indicates that people can fuse separate, but related, information into integrated
wholes in memory. A more recent study by Gómez-Ariza and Bajo (2003) built on this
by asking participants to remember sentences about people that could be integrated into
one idea unit. For example, “The fireman went to the store,” “The fireman bought a
bone,” “The fireman has a dog,” could be integrated into “The fireman went to the store
to buy a bone for his dog.” When sentences were memorized that could be fused into one
idea or mental representation, it eliminated the fan effect.
Myers, O’Brien, Balota, and Toyofuku (1984) studied integration in the form of
causality. They had participants study sets of sentences that were either highly casually
linked to each other (e.g., “The banker found the baseball game boring” and “He went
home early”) or else they were related but not casually linked. There was a reversed fan
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effect for the materials that could be casually integrated; that is, there was a speed up in
response time. Although, Myers et al. (1984) used an elaborated ACT model to explain
the results, they can be better explained from a situation model view. It is possible that
giving reasons for the character actions allowed participants to better integrate the
sentences into one coherent mental representation.
Smith, Adams, and Schorr (1978) studied integration in terms of world
knowledge. In their fan effect experiments, they manipulated whether the facts could be
integrated or not. For instance, all participants were presented with sentences such as
“Ryan remained expressionless. Ryan found mistakes were expensive.” In the integrated
condition, people were then given a theme sentence that helped the previous two
sentences make sense (e.g., “Ryan was learning to play poker”), whereas in the
nonintegrated condition, which also served as the control, people were given a neutral
sentence (e.g., “Ryan was expecting to meet someone”). Integrated sentences produced
smaller fan effects than the nonintegrated sentences. This was true whether the theme
sentence was given before or after the other two sentences. The integration did not
eliminate the fan effect to the extent that was observed using the manipulation by
Radvansky and Zacks (1991), but it does show how integration can influence the size of
the fan effect.
Ricks and Wiley (2010) examined integration with domain knowledge. Across
two studies, participants memorized player-location sentences (e.g., “The catcher is on
the mound”) and the pairings were either random or consistent with baseball
expectations. When the pairings were random, people showed a fan effect; however,
when pairings were plausible, participants did not demonstrate a fan effect for studied
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sentences. These results suggest that expertise in a particular domain can promote
integration.
Research has also examined other factors that can influence the fan effect and
whether concepts are integrated or not. Radvansky (2005) manipulated the format of
encoding by comparing the memorization of complete object-location sentences (e.g.,
“The tanning bed is in the gas station”) to the memorization of probe pairs (e.g., tanning
bed-gas station). The complete sentences led to integration, but the probe pairs produced
the typical fan effect. In addition to this study, Radvansky and Copeland (2006) showed
that integration can occur when presenting object-location facts in pictures (as opposed to
sentences). Thus, the integration of information into situation models appears to happen
when people can construct a plausible representation around a single event.
People / Characters
While much of the research with the fan effect has used objects and locations, it is
also possible to learn multiple pieces of information about people. Because this thesis
focuses on people / characters in relation to the fan effect, I will first review some
findings of people / characters in memory and learning. This will be followed by a
consideration of the fan effect research that has explored information learned about
people.
Most of the research with characters has been studied in the realm of narrative
comprehension. Characters have been described as the “meat” of a situation model
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). This is because most stories are essentially about what
happens to characters. Characters are the foundation for the other dimensions - what their
goals are (intention), where they go in the story world (space), the decisions they make
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(causality), and the time frame in which the story takes place (time). Reading times slow
down when new characters are introduced because readers are updating their current
model (Zwaan, Radvansky, Hillard, & Curiel, 1998).
Readers’ mental representations of the character dimension become enhanced
when a main character is rementioned and weakened when a new character is introduced
(Gernsbacher, Robertson, Palladino, & Werner, 2004). For example, participants
responded faster to the main character’s name after a character was rementioned than
when a new character was introduced or no characters were mentioned. This same effect
was found when objects associated with the character were used as probes. This
demonstrates that a character becomes more accessible in a reader’s mental
representation after the character is rementioned; however, when a new character is
introduced it interferes with the accessibility of an old character.
The use of proper names also enhances character representations. Naming a
character (e.g., Jake) focused readers’ attention on a specific character more than when
she/he was named with a role description, such as “the insurance agent” (Sanford, Moar,
& Garrod, 1988). Sentences that contained anaphoric references to characters mentioned
by proper name were read more rapidly than those referring to a character named by a
role. It is possible that readers more readily include named characters into their situation
models because they believe that they will have more significance to the story than
unnamed characters.
People do not only construct situation models of characters, but when reading
narratives they also include information about characters’ attributes and how those
characters should behave. For instance, readers will slow down when presented with trait
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inconsistent information (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993), such as, if a character was
previously described as a vegetarian but then later in the story that character ate a
hamburger. Similarly, Rapp and colleagues (Mensink & Rapp, 2011; Rapp, Gerrig, &
Prentice, 2001) found that readers will track protagonists’ traits and apply that
information to how the character will act in pursuit of a goal. For example, people may be
more likely to agree with an outcome such as, “Henry helped the kid,” after reading a
story about Henry being sympathetic. Reading times are also likely to slow down when
stories end with trait-inconsistent actions (e.g., “Henry did not help the kid”) because this
outcome is surprising to readers who remember that Henry is sympathetic. This suggests
that readers monitor information about traits during normal comprehension and keep
those traits active in their current model.
Readers will also keep track of objects that are related to the characters. Glenberg,
Meyer, and Lindem (1987) created stories where objects were either associated or
dissociated with the character. For example consider, “Gina put on a scarf on before
going outside.” In this example, the scarf would be associated with Gina. On the contrary,
for the sentence, “Gina took off a scarf before going outside,” the scarf is dissociated
from Gina. As people continued reading, they were presented with the name of the
critical object and had to indicate if the object was in the story. Response times were
slower for objects that were dissociated than for objects that were associated, even though
the same number of words intervened since the object was mentioned in either condition.
This finding suggests that characters will keep objects that are associated with the
character in their current model. In another study (Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1989),
people responded faster to object probes that were in the room the character was thinking
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about (e.g., “Gina really wanted to go to the park”) than the room the in which the
character was actually located. Again, this suggests that people keep track of objects in
relation to characters. Furthermore, it shows how readers place more priority on the
character than other dimensions like space.
Other studies have examined memory recall for characters, but these studies did
not use narratives. Kole and Healy (2007) examined how memory set size influences
retention and response times for fictional characters. They had participants memorize 48
facts total, with one group memorizing 4 facts about 12 individuals, and the other group
memorizing 12 facts about 4 individuals. The four individual group made fewer errors
and had faster response times on the cued recall test than the 12 individual group. The
results of this study suggest that having information presented in a way that can be
grouped in a smaller number of categories gives the learner an advantage because they
can form a smaller number of more highly integrated mental representations.
Together, whether narratives are used to introduce characters or not, these studies
show that people can monitor and update information about characters. Some studies
even suggest that people actively integrate related information about a character. The
following section describes research involving people / character information that was
specifically examined in the context of the fan effect.
The Fan Effect and People
Radvansky, Spieler, and Zacks (1993) examined whether readers would organize
their mental representations around people instead of locations if they used study
sentences involving people in locations, rather than objects in locations (as used by
Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). In other words, they investigated if there would be a reversal
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of the fan effect found in previous experiments where several people associated with one
location will show a fan effect but several locations associated with one person will not.
This person-based rather than location-based organization was found but only for
locations where only one person could occupy the space For example, a set of sentences
such as, “The banker is in the phone booth,” “The banker is in the voting booth,” and
“The banker is in the tanning bed,” would lead to no fan effect, but a set of sentences
such as, “The banker is in the phone booth,” “The police officer is in the phone booth,”
and “The firefighter is in the phone booth,” would lead to a fan effect. When locations
were used in which multiple people could occupy it (e.g., airport), the data were more
consistent with Anderson’s (1974) finding and there is no difference between single
locations and multiple locations. Interestingly, when both small and large locations were
used in a material set, a person-based organization emerged.
In addition to small spaces, there are other factors that determine whether one
uses a person-based organization or location-based organization. Radvansky, Wyer,
Curiel, and Lutz (1997) manipulated ownership through verb phrases (e.g., is buying
versus owns) and the likelihood of the objects being in the same location (e.g., drugstore
items versus unrelated items). They found a person-based organization when the verb
phrase is buying was used and when the objects were ones that could be purchased at a
drugstore (e.g., “The teacher is buying the toothpaste”). It is important to note that
participants were not explicitly told that these objects could be purchased at a drugstore.
A person-based organization was not found for conditions where objects were unlikely to
be bought in the same location (e.g., diamond ring, toothpaste, and DVD) or when the
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verb phrase owns was used. This study demonstrates that ownership and facts related to
specific situations can together guide memory organization.
Other researchers have also examined how people organize information about
people in memory. Lewis and Anderson (1976) had participants study true and false
statements about well-known people and then verified if the statements were true. A fan
effect was found with the more false statements memorized about a person resulting in
longer reading times. Reder and Ross (1983) had participants study statements about a
character and varied the number of themes related to that character. They found that the
greater number of themes studied about a character, the longer the reading times
Prior knowledge of a character can also influence the size of the fan. Anderson
(1981) varied the amount of information that participants were given about individuals
through paragraphs, sentences, or a list of names. Participants then went on to learn
person-location facts about the individuals that were unrelated to the previously learned
information about the individuals. The results showed that there were smaller fan effects
when they were given prior knowledge. This suggests that the prior knowledge may have
caused some people to integrate the information into a representation centered around
those individuals.
Jones and Anderson (1987) examined integration of person concepts in the
context of the fan effect. They manipulated whether sets of words were related with a
given person (e.g., Shane, hunter, rifle, forest) or unrelated (e.g., Mike, opera, kingdom,
lover). The related sets of words produced a smaller fan effect than the unrelated set of
words. It is likely that in the related condition it was easier to create a single mental
representation than in the unrelated condition; however, the authors interpreted these

15

findings in the context of the indirect-pathway model where participants were able to use
pre-experimental associations to aid them in decisions.
In addition to these findings, time can also influence whether information is
organized based on person (Radvansky, Zwaan, Federico, and Franklin, 1998). For
example, people are more likely to integrate information into a single situation model if a
set of sentences includes the same verb tense (e.g., present). People are also able to create
single situation model when they can center it on one event in time (e.g., when the bomb
went off). Perhaps, most interestingly, a single situation model can only be created when
it is plausible that the activities can be performed by the same person in the same
location. For example, “Ron was writing with his pen,” “Ron was eating chocolate,” and
“Ron was listening to a lecture,” can occur at the same time, so only one situation model
needs to be constructed, centered around Ron at that time. In contrast, “Ron was playing
chess,” “Ron was swimming,” and “Ron was reading a book,” encourages readers to
develop separate situation models because those events cannot occur at once. This
finding indicates that people use their previous world knowledge to aid them in
constructing situation models.
Focusing on one dimension during encoding can also influence the fan effect.
Sohn, Anderson, Reder, and Goode (2004) manipulated participants’ focus on either
person or location by using a slightly different study / test procedure. The person-focused
group studied sentences such as, “The doctor is in the park,” and were then presented
with a picture of the corresponding person. After the study phase, they had to identify the
correct face (e.g., doctor) from 25 faces and then were asked to type in all the places
associated with the person. The location-focused condition was tested in a similar matter
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except that they were presented with pictures of the locations (e.g., park). In addition,
participants were explicitly instructed to focus on either the person or location dimension,
respectively. Results showed a larger fan effect (i.e., longer response times) for the
focused dimension than the nonfocused dimension, which was the opposite pattern than
what would have been predicted by situation model theory. This was explained as the
focus on a particular dimension created more emphasis on the multiple associations for
that dimension, which then created a larger fan effect.
However, it should be noted that instructional effects do not always occur. For
example, when participants were given instructions to either memorize objects organized
around a location or objects, participants memorized around locations despite the
instructions they were given (Radvansky and Zacks, 1991). This makes the results of the
Sohn et al. (2004) study puzzling because they did not find a differential fan effect in the
location condition. Perhaps the inclusion of pictures, in addition to sentences, produced
the traditional fan effect because then people had the verbal representation and the picture
representation competing at study. These findings together suggest that attention can
influence the fan effect but it has to be a strong manipulation.
The retrieval strategy used during the testing phase can also influence the fan
effect. Reder and Ross (1983) manipulated if participants made recognition judgments or
consistency judgments. For recognition judgments, they had to indicate if a sentence was
studied or not, which is the procedure used in most fan effect studies. For consistency
judgments, they only had to determine if the sentence was consistent with what they
already learned about the character. They found that there is a reversal of the fan effect
when participants made consistency judgments, in that the more facts studied about a
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person, the shorter the reaction times. Although, they did not interrupt their results this
way, it is possible that when making consistency judgments they were able to retrieve a
situation model instead of searching for the fact in memory.
ACT-R Theory versus Situation Model Theory
The findings of certain materials being able to eliminate the fan effect prompted
Anderson and Reder (1999) to offer some explanation as to how these results can be
explained by the ACT-R theory. They refer to these alternative findings as the differential
fan effects because they do not interpret the results as a non-fan effect, rather that the
concepts are just being weighted differently. As a starting point, Anderson and Reder
(1999) note that during learning for a traditional fan effect study, as long as all facts
about the different concepts are presented and tested with equal frequency, then all of the
weights within a fan level should be equal and that weights should be lower when fan is
larger. That is, all items with a fan of 1 should have equal weights, but those items should
have lower weights than items with a fan of 3. However, for a set of materials that lead to
a differential fan effect, Anderson and Reder (1999) proposed that (for some reason)
people focus more on one concept from an association during testing, causing it to have a
lower weighting in memory (and more likely to be a differential fan effect). Consistent
with this explanation, using lower weightings for some concepts in the model can indeed
lead to a prediction of a differential fan effect (however, it is not clear a priori why those
weightings would differ). Anderson and Reder (1999) expanded on this idea by noting
that the differential fan effect can be shown with the same materials, but what differed
was how testing occurred (Reder & Ross, 1983); thus, according to them, the fan effect
occurs during testing. On the contrary, with the situation model view, there is a
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differential fan effect (i.e., no interference during retrieval) because the concepts have
been integrated into one model as people organized the information during learning.
Thus, a major difference between the situation model view and the ACT-R view is that
the former suggests that people organize their mental models during study while the latter
suggests that fan (or a differential fan) occurs during testing.
Radvansky (1999) acknowledged that testing procedures can influence the size of
the fan effect, but he also pointed out that the participants in his differential fan effect
studies (e.g., Radvansky & Zacks, 1991) were tested the same in all conditions.
Radvansky (1999) also criticized the weightings explanation for a number of reasons.
First, in order to get the weightings that lead to a differential fan effect, the weightings for
some concepts would be less than zero; this is important because a positive weighting
means that two ideas are associated whereas a negative weighting means that two ideas
are dissociated. In other words, some pairings that were studied were weighted as not
being highly associated, and in some cases, as being dissociated. A second criticism made
by Radvansky (1999) was that in most of his experiments, the same exact concepts were
used, presented the same number of times, and were questioned equally from both
perspectives (e.g., “What is in __ location?” and “Where is ___ person/object?”); thus,
according to Anderson and Reder’s (1999) explanation, those items should receive the
same weightings. However, some items led to a fan effect while others led to a
differential fan effect (e.g., if they referred to a single event). Finally, Radvansky (1999)
also criticized the fact that the weightings explanation was just the latest of a number of
different explanations that have been proposed by Anderson and colleagues to explain the
differential fan effect using the ACT model.
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A major criticism of the situation model view is that the presence of a differential
fan effect depends on the types of materials used. That is, the dimension that participants
used to organize situation model varied across studies (i.e., in some studies people
constructed situation models based on spatial locations, but in other studies people
constructed situation models based on characters), which Anderson and Reder (1999) saw
as a lack of converging evidence. However, Radvansky (1999) argued that people can
switch the concept or dimension in which they organize their mental representation
because the focus of a situation model can be different, depending on the framing of the
description or the plausibility of the situation itself. Thus, organization differed across
experiments because the types of materials used were different.
Anderson and Reder (1999) also noted that there were some differences among
the concepts that were used by Radvansky (e.g., Radvansky et al., 1993). In particular,
the location concepts had higher concrete ratings and also contained more words (e.g.,
nearest voting booth), which could provide more cues for retrieval. However, Radvansky
(1999) argued that the concepts did not differ in concreteness and that in an earlier,
unpublished study (Radvansky, 1992, as cited in Radvansky 1999) the syllable lengths
were equal, but yet a differential fan effect was still observed.
In summary, according to situation model theory, people can center their
representations around people much like they can around location, which can eliminate
the fan effect (Radvansky et al., 1993). However, there are ways to influence the
magnitude of the fan effect in relation to character. For instance, the more themes studied
about a character, the larger the fan effect (Reder and Ross, 1983). Also, presenting
person concepts that are related and studying concepts about characters in which
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participants have prior knowledge can produce smaller fan effects (Jones & Anderson,
1987). Altering the general fan effect procedure can also influence the magnitude of the
fan effect with people (Sohn et al., 2004; Reder and Ross, 1983).
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CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which people can integrate
physical attributes of characters in situation models. Specifically, in these experiments I
used the basic fan effect paradigm (e.g., Radvansky & Zacks, 1991) to examine whether
people would form an integrated situation model of attribute information centered around
person concepts which would be consistent with the studies conducted by Radvansky and
colleagues (e.g., Radvansky et al., 1993) or if they would demonstrate a classic fan effect
(e.g., Anderson, 1974) where they are unable to integrate the attribute information. Most
fan effect studies involving situation model representations have focused on object and
location pairings. The few studies that have examined the fan effect in relation with
people have looked at person and location pairings (e.g., Radvansky et al., 1993),
integration based on themes (e.g., Reder & Ross, 1983), and integration based on
previous knowledge (e.g., Lewis and Anderson, 1976). In contrast to those studies, in the
current study people were presented with sentences that described different character
attributes.
A key manipulation in this thesis was whether the described attributes were
situational or permanent. A situational attribute is one that could be relevant only to a
specific situation, such as a person wearing sunglasses (e.g., because it is sunny outside).
In contrast, a permanent attribute is one that is stable across situations, such as a person
having a large, crooked nose. This manipulation is important because permanent
attributes should be more likely to be integrated into a single representation of a
character, whereas situational attributes should not. The reason for this is that permanent

22

attributes are true, regardless of the situation, and people can potentially integrate these
into a single representation of that person. However, situational attributes can be
dependent on specific situations and may not be included in a single representation. For
example, it is possible for situational attributes to contradict each other (e.g., wearing
boots while hiking through mud, but being barefoot while at the beach). The described
attributes were permanent in Experiment 1 and situational in Experiment 2. Experiment 3
contained situational attribute contradictions to observe if they influence integration; the
reason for this is that in Experiment 2, even though the attributes are situational, people
may still integrate them because the studied sentences do not explicitly state that the
attributes relate to different situations. In Experiment 3, contradicting attributes should
make it clear that the traits relate to different situations. Experiment 4 examined whether
including locations during the study phase would influence the results. That is, in
Experiments 4, the fact that the contradicting attributes refer to different situations was
made even clearer for participants. Finally, Experiment 5 used conflicting emotional
attributes to make it more difficult for participants to visualize the attributes due to their
abstractness. All five experiments followed the same basic procedure except for the
different attribute types and the inclusion / exclusion of locations during study.
Additionally, a second manipulation was whether the sentences described
different attributes about the same person or the same attributes about different people.
More specifically, the experiments compared when different attributes are presented
about the same person (e.g., “Emma has red lipstick,” “Emma has dark sunglasses,”
“Emma has a green scarf”) versus when different characters have the same attribute (e.g.,
“Emma has red lipstick,” “Susan has red lipstick,” “Diane has red lipstick”). This
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manipulation is similar to the comparison of single location versus multiple locations in
some of the other fan effect studies (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991; Radvansky et al., 1993).
The same person / different attribute condition is similar to the single location condition
with the person being the anchor for the different attributes just like how the location was
the anchor for the objects. The different person / same attribute condition is similar to the
multiple location condition because the same attributes are in different locations (i.e., on
different people).
The third manipulation examines whether including locations during study
influences the way people organize attributes. Specifically, this examined whether adding
different locations to the conflicting attributes condition would motivate people to create
separate mental representations. Likewise, same locations were tested to determine
whether that motivates people to create one representation despite the conflicting nature
of the attributes.
The other key manipulation, which is present in all fan effect studies, was the
different levels of fan. There were fan levels of one and three in the current set of
experiments. For example, a fan level of one would be where participants only learn one
attribute about the person (e.g., “Mary has blonde hair”), whereas in a fan level of three,
participants would either learn three facts relating multiple attributes to a single person
(e.g., “Mary has blonde hair,” “Mary has blue eyes,” “Mary has white teeth”) or three
facts relating multiple people to one attribute (e.g., “Steve has blonde hair,” “Doug has
blonde hair,” “Andre has blonde hair”). Based on these manipulations, this was a 3 level
within-subjects design for all of the experiments. The three levels of the independent
variable were (1) one person with one attribute (fan level 1), (2) three people with one
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attribute (fan level 3), and (3) one person with three attributes (fan level 3). The basic
experiments consisted of participants first studying a list of sentences until they were
memorized, followed by a recognition test. The recognition test items consisted of
sentences presented during the study phase and sentences that were similar except for the
wrong pairing of people and attributes. This recognition test was used to test the
predictions of ACT-R (Anderson, 1993) and situation model theory (Radvansky and
Zacks, 1991; Radvansky et al., 1993).
The main hypotheses revolved around the fan effect. First, the one person with
one attribute condition was used as a baseline or control condition. In this condition,
because the person and the attributes do not overlap with any other facts, these
relationships were classified as a fan level 1 and because of this, should be stored
independently as there are no associations with other learned facts. Regardless of whether
the attributes were permanent or situational, performance should be the fastest and most
accurate in this condition because there should have been little to no interference.
For the one person with three attributes condition, there were multiple traits
presented about the same person. Even though this was a fan level 3, situation model
theory predicts that people would be able to integrate the permanent traits around the
person, thus resulting in no fan effect at retrieval. This outcome would be consistent with
a person-based organization (Radvansky et al., 1993) where people based their situation
models around person concepts. However, for the situational attributes, there should be a
fan effect because, according to situation model theory, despite the attributes being
related to the same person, those attributes would be based on separate situations and
should not be integrated. This would be consistent with the Radvansky and colleagues
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(1998) study where participants did not integrate activities that could not be performed at
the same time (i.e., based on different situations). For the conflicting situational
attributes, it was predicted that there would be an even larger fan effect because not only
were traits based on separate situations, but it was very unlikely for them to occur
together in real life. This prediction was based on the findings that general knowledge
about the world can influence whether participants integrate concepts or not (e.g., Smith
et al., 1978).
The ACT-R theory predicts that there would be a fan effect for either permanent
or situational attributes because multiple facts, while stored separately, would be
associated with one concept. This outcome would be consistent with the Lewis and
Anderson (1974) finding that the more concepts studied about people, the larger the fan
effect. Based on the explanation given by Anderson and Reder (1999), as long as
concepts are presented the same number of times during study and are questioned in a
similar manner during the test phase (of learning), concepts of the same fan level can be
assumed to have similar weightings; this was true in the current set of experiments. In
addition, the recognition test procedure was the same for all items, with all items being
tested in the same manner an equal number of times; thus, there were no differences at
testing either, which would suggest that there should be no differences in weightings
within a fan level.
For the three people with one attribute condition, this was a fan level 3 as there
were multiple people that share the same attribute. For both permanent and temporary
attributes, situation model theory and ACT-R would both predict a fan effect, but for
different reasons. Situation model theory predicts a fan effect because recognition of the
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shared trait can trigger the access of three separate models (that all contain that attribute),
which could lead to interference. ACT-R predicts a fan effect because there are multiple
associations (i.e., the different characters) associated with one concept (i.e., the attribute).
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
A total of 36 (20 females, 16 males) participants with a mean age of 21.7 years
were recruited from the subject pool at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Participants
were issued research credit for their psychology course. The only restrictions for
participation were that one needed to be at least 18 years of age at the time of
participation and able to fluently speak and understand English.
Materials and Procedure
All of the tasks were completed on a PC using the E-Prime experimental
presentation software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2001). After the consent
process, participants began the study phase; here they were presented with a total of 18
sentences and instructed to memorize them as efficiently as possible. The sentences were
in the simple format of “Person is/has attribute,” where Person consisted of a proper
first-name and attribute consisted of a specific permanent attribute. The person names
were two syllables and phonologically similar names (e.g., Sara and Tara) were not used.
In addition, the names were rated by a separate group of people to make sure that they
were all similar in terms of being common. This was done by asking people to rate a list
of possible names on a scale from 1 to 7, where a 1 represented a very unique name and a
7 represented a very common name. All of the names used in Experiment 1 had a rating
of 4.71 or higher. It should be pointed out that while it is typical to use occupation titles
when using people / characters in fan effect studies (e.g., Radvansky et al., 1993), names
were used in this thesis because with the examination of attributes, it was possible that
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occupation titles could activate certain schemas of people and interfere with learning the
traits. For example, learning that a police officer was wearing flip-flops might create
some interference because the participant could automatically represent a stereotype,
such as a man in a standard police uniform, and it would be strange for a uniformed cop
to wear flip-flops.
The attributes presented in Experiment 1 were permanent attributes that were
stable across situations (e.g., hair color, skin color, body type, etc.). The same group of
participants who rated names were also asked to rate a list of attributes in terms of being
situational or permanent. For this task, they used a scale from 1 to 7 where a 1
represented an attribute that was clearly situational and a 7 represented an attribute that
was clearly permanent. Attributes with scores greater than 5 were used in Experiment 1
and, as a preview, attributes with scores less than 3 were used in Experiments 2 and 3.
The sentences were created by initially using a random process to match names
and attributes; however, some restrictions were necessary, as described below. The 14
names and 14 attributes were matched to create six sentences for each of the following
conditions: (1) one person with one attribute, (2) one person with three attributes, and (3)
three people with one attribute. In condition 1, there were six sentences that did not
overlap in terms of name or attribute at all. In condition 2, there were three sentences
about one person (each describing a different attribute for that person), and a second set
of three sentences about a different person with three different attributes. For condition 3,
there were three sentences about different people having the same attribute, and then a
second set of three sentences about different people having the same attribute (but
different people and a different attribute than the first set). Because the attributes used in
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Experiment 1 were permanent, conflicting attributes (e.g., referring to two different eyes
colors) were not included, and the combination of attributes selected for the different
conditions were evaluated by the experimenter to make sure that they made sense for a
person to have in real life. For example, someone having very dark skin coloring and red
hair was not used because it does not occur very often in real life. To help ease any
concerns of experimenter bias in terms of matching terms for the sentences, a total of four
sets of the 18 sentences were created, and these sets were counter-balanced across
participants. The four sets of sentences are listed in Appendix A.
For the study phase, the sentences were presented in a random order for each
participant, one sentence at a time on the computer for 7 seconds each. After viewing all
of the sentences, the test phase began and the participants were presented with 28 test
questions in the form of “What attribute(s) does person have?” and “Who has attribute?”
There was one question for each name and attribute. These questions were presented in a
random order that did not correspond to the presentation order during the study phase and
each question included a number that indicated how many answers there were for that
question (i.e., 1 or 3). Participants typed each answer, followed by the <ENTER> key,
and when all answers were entered for that question, the computer displayed the correct
answer(s). At that point, they were prompted to press the space bar to advance to the next
question. After they answered all of the test questions, participants began the study phase
again, followed by another test phase. This study-test procedure repeated until
participants answered all the questions correctly twice (i.e., two perfect test scores). This
method was used in most fan effect studies to ensure that participants have committed all
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the facts to memory. A different random order of the sentences and test questions were
used for each study and test trial.
After participants achieved two perfect test scores, they moved on to the speeded
recognition test. In this test, participants were presented with one sentence at a time and
the task was to indicate if the sentence was presented during study or not. Participants
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible when making their judgments. All 18 of
the study sentences were presented (i.e., “yes” responses) along with an equal number of
sentences that were not presented (i.e., “no” responses). These non-studied sentences
were created by combining names and attributes from the study phase into pairings that
were different than those used in the study phase. Participants were instructed to press the
left button on the computer mouse, labeled “Y”, to indicate that it was a studied sentence,
and they were instructed to press the right button, labeled “N”, to indicate that it was a
new sentence; response times and accuracy were measured during the recognition test.
After each incorrect response, participants were given feedback with a prompt of “Error”
that was presented for 1 second. To familiarize the participants with the buttons,
participants first completed ten practice trials where they were presented with either the
prompt “SENTENCE STUDIED” (response of “Y”) or “SENTENCE NOT STUDIED”
(response of “N”). After the practice trials, participants were presented with four blocks
of the 36 sentences, given a short self-paced break, and then presented with the remaining
four blocks. Within each block, the sentences were presented in a random order, yielding
a total of 288 trials. Upon completion of the recognition test, participants were debriefed
and assigned credit.
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Design and Analyses
Memory Response Times and Error Rates
For both the response time and error rate data from the speeded recognition test,
the data were submitted to a one-way repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
with three levels (one person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three
people with one attribute). According to situation model theory, relative to the one person
with one attribute condition, there should be a fan effect (i.e., slowdown and more errors)
for different characters sharing one attribute, but not when the one character has three
attribute. According to ACT-R, relative to the one person with one attribute condition,
there should be a fan effect (i.e., slowdown and more errors) for three people with one
attribute and for one person with three attributes.
Results
Learning
Participants took an average of 6.39 (SE=0.42) study cycles to memorize the
sentences. The mean accuracy across study cycles was computed for each condition. A
one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there were no differences among the
means, F(1, 35) = 1.73, MSE = 0.005 , p = 0.184, ηp2 = 0.047 (see Appendix B).
Response times
The response time data for correct responses were trimmed by removal of any
response time shorter than 200 milliseconds or longer than 8,000 milliseconds. In
addition, in accordance with the criteria defined by Van Selst and Jolicour (1994), a
proportion of data was trimmed as a function of the sample size for a given participant.
This resulted in 6.79% of the data being trimmed.
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The response time data were submitted to one-way repeated measures ANOVA
(one person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with one
attribute) and the means are presented in Figure 1. For all analyses, an alpha level of 0.05
was used to determine statistical significance; Bonferroni adjustments were used for the
follow-up t-tests. The test indicated that condition type had a significant effect on
response times F(1, 35) = 5.89, MSE = 221788.54, p = 0.004, ηp2 = .144. Follow-up
paired t-tests revealed that response times for the one person with one attribute condition
(M = 13.74.43, SE = 68.63) were significantly faster than the three people with one
attribute condition (M = 1496.80, SE = 85.12), t(35) = 2.84, p = 0.022. The response
times for the one person with three attributes condition (M = 1350.46, SE = 48.46) were
also faster than the three people with one attribute condition, t(35) = 2.80, p = 0.025.
However, the one person with one attribute condition was not statistically different from
the one person with three attributes condition, t(35) = 0.58, p = 1.00.
Error rates
The mean error rate in Experiment 1 was 2.9 %. Similar to the response time data,
these data were analyzed with a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (one person with
one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with one attribute) and the
means are presented in Figure 2. This analysis was not significant, F(1, 35) = 1.44, MSE
= 0.001, p = 0.245, ηp2 = 0.039.
Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated the possibility that when sentences were presented that
were about the same person, it would produce a differential fan effect. This hypothesis
was supported with a differential fan effect for response times. Specifically, there was no
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fan observed for the one person with three attributes condition (it was similar to the one
person with one attribute condition) but there was a traditional fan effect for the three
people with one attribute condition. These results are consistent with situation model
theory because participants were quicker to retrieve information that could be integrated
into a single situation; in this case, a situation model built around the representation of a
person. This is consistent with a person based organization, which has been found in
other studies (e.g., Radvansky et al., 1993).
The results are not consistent with the predictions made by the ACT-R model
because according to it, the response times for the one person with three attributes
condition should have been no different than the three people with one attribute
condition. This is because they both contain three associations related to a single concept.
However, those two conditions were statistically different.
While the response time data showed differences among the conditions, there
were no differences for the accuracy data. One likely possibility for this outcome is that it
was due to a ceiling effect, as the mean error rate was less than 3%. Another possibility is
that it was due to a speed-accuracy trade-off, with participants emphasizing accuracy in
all conditions. It is important to note that the current study is similar to past studies of the
fan effect because in the latter, fan effects are more likely to be observed for response
time data than accuracy data (e.g., Radvansky et al.,1998).
In Experiment 1, the attributes were permanent, and it was expected that
participants would easily integrate them for a person because they should be true
regardless of the situation. Experiment 2 will investigate whether people integrate
situational attributes. It was predicted that situational attributes may be less likely to be
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integrated because they can be based on different situations, and because of this, people
may create separate mental models for each attribute.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
A total of 36 participants (22 females, 14 males) with a mean age of 19.9 years
were recruited from the subject pool at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and
participants were issued research credit for their psychology course. The only restrictions
for participation were that one needed to be at least 18 years of age at the time of
participation and able to fluently speak and understand English. None of these individuals
participated in Experiment 1.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1
except for one change. Instead of using sentences that described permanent attributes,
situational attributes were used instead. While permanent attributes are thought to be
present across all situations, the attributes used in Experiment 2 were more situation
dependent (e.g., accessories, clothing items, etc.). These items were selected from the set
of attributes that were rated prior to Experiment 1. As a reminder, a separate group of
participants was asked to rate attributes using a scale from 1 (situational) to 7
(permanent). The attributes used in Experiment 2 were selected from those items that had
a mean rating less than 3. As in Experiment 1, names and attributes were pseudo
randomly combined to create four sets of 18 sentences with the only restriction being that
the clothing items had to correspond to different body parts in the one person with three
attributes condition to avoid potential conflicts in participants’ mental representations.
See Appendix A for a listing of the four sets of sentences used in Experiment 2.
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Design and Analyses
Memory Response Times and Error Rates
As in Experiment 1, the response time and error rate data from the speeded
recognition test were each submitted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with three
levels (one person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with
one attribute). In contrast to Experiment 1, both situation model theory and ACT-R
predicted the same pattern of results in Experiment 2. Specifically, there was expected to
be a fan effect (i.e., slowdown and more errors) for different characters sharing one
attribute and the same character with three different attributes, relative to the one person
with one attribute condition, which should be the fastest and most accurate condition.
However, if participants do not recognize that the situational attributes are dependent on
the situation, it is possible that they may integrate them into a single representation,
leading to a similar pattern that was predicted by situation model theory in Experiment 1.
Results
Learning
Participants took an average of 5.19 (SE=0.33) study cycles to memorize the
sentences. As with Experiment 1, the mean accuracy across study cycles was computed
for each condition. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the means were
not significantly different F(1, 35) = 2.93, MSE = 0.007, p = 0.060, ηp2 = 0.077 (see
Appendix B).
Response times
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The same trimming procedure from Experiment 1 was also used for Experiment
2, resulting in 6.0 % of the response times being trimmed. The response time data were
then submitted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (one person with one attribute,
one person with three attributes, three people with one attribute) and the means are
presented in Figure 3. As in Experiment 1, an alpha level of 0.05 was used and
Bonferroni corrections were made for the follow-up tests. The ANOVA indicated that
condition type had a significant effect on response times, F(1, 35) = 4.68, MSE =
69826.25, p = 0.012, ηp2 = 0.118. Paired samples t-tests revealed that the response times
for the one person with one attribute condition (M = 1408.16, SE = 39.28) were faster
than in the three people with one attribute condition (M = 1484.32, SE = 49.22), t(35) =
2.76, p = 0.027. The response times for the one person with three attributes condition (M
= 1407.91, SE = 47.89) was also faster than the three people with one attribute condition,
t(35) = 3.01, p = 0.015. As in Experiment 1, the one person with one attribute condition
was not statistically different from the one person with three attributes condition, t(35)
0.008, p = 1.00.
Error rates
Overall, the mean error rate in Experiment 2 was 2.6 %. These data were analyzed
with a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (one person with one attribute, one person
with three attributes, three people with one attributes) and the means are presented in
Figure 4. The result was not significant, F(1, 35) = 0.35, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.704, ηp2 =
0.010.
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 were very similar with what was observed in
Experiment 1, which showed that people were able to integrate permanent attributes
about characters. In Experiment 2, situational attributes were used, but the results still
demonstrated a differential fan effect for the response times with integration occurring for
the one person with three attributes condition. The general finding is consistent with
situation model theory, because participants were quicker to retrieve information about
one person (even when there were three attributes related to that person) than when
information was presented about three different people.
In Experiment 2, it is possible that people were able to integrate situational
attributes because, while they were technically situational, they were not tied to different
specific situations. Because of this, people may have easily integrated the attributes about
a single person in a representation such as, “Gabby is wearing a blue beanie, tight yoga
pants, and sunglasses.” Even though these attributes are situational, the example situation
could be a plausible integration of traits in real life. Therefore, to emphasize the
situational aspect of the attributes, Experiment 3 investigated situational attributes that
were conflicting. That is, all of the attributes related to a single person occurred on the
same body part and would be a very unlikely combination to occur simultaneously in real
life. Unlike what was observed in Experiments 1 and 2, it was predicted that there would
be a fan effect for the one person with three attributes condition, because unlike the
previous experiments, it would be harder to create an integrated situation model based on
plausible real life scenarios.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants
A total of 36 participants (24 female, 12 male) with a mean age of 19.5 years were
recruited from the subject pool at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and participants
were issued research credit for their psychology course. The only restrictions for
participation were that one needed to be at least 18 years of age at the time of
participation and able to fluently speak and understand English. None of these individuals
participated in Experiments 1 or 2.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure for Experiment 3 were identical to Experiment 2
except for one change. To encourage participants to identify that the attributes were
situational, the situational attributes used in Experiment 3 were attributes that conflicted;
that is, these were three attributes that a person should not be able to have at the same
time (e.g., “Frank is wearing a bike helmet,” “Frank is wearing a baseball cap,” “Frank is
wearing a cowboy hat”). The situational attributes were selected from the set of attributes
that were rated prior to Experiment 1, and only those items with a score less than 3 (using
the scale from 1, situational, to 7, permanent) were used. Conflict was determined by
selecting attributes that corresponded to the same body part (e.g., face), thus, it was
unlikely that the attributes would occur simultaneously together in real life. The four sets
of 18 sentences are listed in Appendix A.
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Design and Analyses
Memory Response Times and Error Rates
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the response time and error rate data from the speeded
recognition test were each submitted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with three
levels (one person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with
one attribute). Both situation model theory and ACT-R predicted the same pattern.
Specifically, there was expected to be a fan effect (i.e., slowdown and more errors) for
different characters sharing one attribute and the same character with three different
attributes, relative to the one person with one attribute condition, which should be the
fastest and most accurate condition.
Results
Learning
Participants took an average of 5.25 (SE = 0.23) study cycles to memorize the
sentences. Just like with Experiment 1 and 2, the mean accuracy across study cycles was
computed for each condition. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the
means were not significantly different F(1, 35) = 0.77, MSE = 0.299, p = 0.468, ηp2 =
0.021 (see Appendix B).
Response times
The same trimming procedure was used for Experiment 3, resulting in 5.9 % of
the response times being trimmed. The response time data was then submitted to a oneway repeated measures ANOVA (one person with one attribute, one person with three
attributes, three people with one attribute) and the means are presented in Figure 5. As in
Experiments 1 and 2, an alpha of 0.05 was used and Bonferroni corrections were made
for follow-up tests. The ANOVA indicated that condition type had a significant effect on
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response times, F(1, 35) = 8.56, MSE = 150241.74, p = 0.000, ηp2 = 0.197. Paired t-tests
revealed that the one person with one attribute condition (M = 1426.01, SE = 45.07) had
significantly faster response times than the three people with one attribute condition (M =
1546.78, SE = 54.97), t(35) = 3.41, p = 0.005. The response times for the one person with
three attributes condition (M = 1446.63, SE = 46.78) were also significantly faster than
the three people with one attribute condition, t(35) = 3.03, p = 0.014. In addition, as in
Experiments 1 and 2, the one person with one attribute condition was not statistically
different from the one person with three attributes condition, t(35) = 0.855, p = 1.00.
Error rates
The overall mean error rate in Experiment 3 was 2.7 %. These data were analyzed
with a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (one person with one attribute, one person
with three attributes, three people with one attribute) and the means are presented in
Figure 6. There was not a significant effect, F(1,35) = 0.32, MSE = 0.00, p = 0.725, ηp2 =
0.009.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 showed the same pattern as Experiments 1 and 2.
However, in this case, the results were not consistent with the predictions made by the
situation model view nor the ACT-R model. There was an integration effect for the one
person with three attributes condition despite the attributes being of a conflicting nature;
the fact that they conflicted should have clearly indicated that they were referring to
separate situations and should not have been integrated. This finding was also
inconsistent with previous research because Radvansky et al. (1997) found that people
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did not integrate information from sentences in which people were buying objects that
were likely bought in different locations.
There are a couple of explanations that could explain the outcome of Experiment
3. First, it is possible that people were employing themes to help them group the
attributes. For instance, Jones and Anderson (1987) found that words that were related to
each other produced smaller fan effects than unrelated words. In regards to Experiment 3,
the conflicting attributes were all on the same body part so they could have used the body
part as a cue to help them retrieve the respective attributes. For example, if participants
were presented with a set of sentences such as, “Holly is wearing a gas mask,” “Holly is
wearing a hockey mask,” and “Holly is wearing sunglasses,” then they could use the
theme that all three attributes were related to the face. A second possibility deals with the
usage of the verb phrase “is wearing;” because all of the verbs were in the same present
tense, it is possible that participants were interpreting that the attributes were all related
on a common spatial-temporal framework (Radvansky, Wyer, Curiel, & Lutz, 1997).
Even though the attributes appeared to conflict, people may have remembered them
easily by relying on a von Restorff effect (1933) due to the unusualness of integrating
those items.
Experiment 4 took another step toward emphasizing the situational nature of the
attributes. Specifically, in Experiment 4, I examined whether adding locations to the
sentences during study would push participants to create separate situation models when
there was one person with three attributes in three locations, but they should create one
situation model when the locations are the same. The procedure for this experiment was
slightly different from the previous experiments in that I used location (different versus
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same) as a between-subjects factor. Because the goal was only to emphasize the
situational nature of the attributes, and not to change the basic task, locations were only
used during study (i.e., not during study testing nor during the recognition test). The
predictions for Experiment 4 were the same as the original predictions for Experiment 3
with regards to the different locations. That is, adding a different spatial location to each
study sentence, in addition to the fact that the attributes conflict, should really emphasize
that the attributes are situational. As a reminder, both situation model theory and the
ACT-R model would predict a similar fan effect for the three people with one attribute
condition as well as for the one person with three attributes condition. However, the
predictions are different for the same location condition. If people process location
information, then the location can be used as a spatial-temporal framework into which all
three sentences can be integrated into a single situation model. Thus, according to
situation model theory, because people can integrate around the location in both
conditions, there should be no fan effect (or at least a smaller fan effect) for either of
those conditions. Therefore, there should be an interaction with location for the person
with three attributes condition, in that people will integrate attributes in the same location
but will not integrate attributes in the different location condition. According to the ACTR model, because there are multiple associations related to a single concept, both
conditions should lead to a fan effect.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants
A total of 72 participants (53 females, 19 males) with a mean age of 19.9 years
were recruited from the subject pool at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and
participants were issued research credit for their psychology course. The only restrictions
for participation were that one needed to be at least 18 years of age at the time of
participation and able to fluently speak and understand English. Participants were
assigned to either the same location group or different location group using a
counterbalancing procedure. None of these individuals participated in the previous three
experiments.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure for Experiment 4 were identical to Experiment 3
except for one change. A spatial location was added to end of the study sentences for all
of the conditions. For example, if in Experiment 3 people were presented with a study
sentence such as, “Austin is wearing a cowboy hat,” the sentence used in Experiment 4
would also include a location, such as, “Austin is wearing a cowboy hat at the airport”.
The same location group had the same location for the one person with three attributes
condition and the three people with one attribute condition. For example, “Austin is
wearing a cowboy hat at the airport,” “Austin is wearing a beanie at the airport,” and
“Austin is wearing a baseball cap at the airport”. However, in the different location
group, there was a different location for every sentence. For example, “Austin is wearing
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a cowboy hat at the bank,” “Austin is wearing a beanie at the hotel,” and “Austin is
wearing a baseball cap at the office.” Large locations where multiple people could be
present were used and pairings of an attribute and location that could be semantically
related were avoided (e.g., “Sally is wearing a lab coat in the laboratory”). It is important
to note that the locations were only presented during the study phase and there were no
questions regarding locations during the study testing procedure or during the recognition
test. This allowed for an emphasis of the situational aspect of the attributes during study,
but by keeping the locations out of the study testing and the recognition test, it did not
change the basic task. The sets of sentences used in Experiment 4 are listed in Appendix
A.
Design and Analyses
Memory Response Times and Error Rates
The response time and error rate data from the speeded recognition test were each
submitted to a 3 x 2 mixed design repeated measures ANOVA with the three fan levels
(one person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with one
attribute) as the within-subjects variable and location (same or different) as the betweensubjects variable. Both situation model theory and ACT-R predicted the same pattern of
results in the different location group. Specifically, there was expected to be a fan effect
(i.e., slowdown and more errors) for different characters sharing one attribute and the
same character with three different attributes, relative to the one person with one attribute
condition, which should be the fastest and most accurate condition. Situation model
theory predicts a differential fan effect because people can organize around locations.
However, it is possible that just presenting locations during study may not be a strong
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enough manipulation to produce a different pattern of results from Experiment 3. The
ACT-R model would predict that presenting the locations during study would not have an
effect on the results compared to the other experiments because according to ACT-R
theory, the fan effect is based primarily on the number of associations and on the retrieval
process.
Results
Learning
Participants took an average of 5.33 (SE = 0.18) study cycles to memorize the
sentences. (see Appendix B) As with the other experiments, the mean accuracy across
study cycles was computed for each condition. The mean accuracy data were then
submitted to a 3 x 2 mixed factorial ANOVA, with fan condition (one person with one
attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with one attribute) as the withinsubjects factor and with location (same or different) as the between-subjects factor. The
ANOVA did not reveal a mean effect of fan for accuracy during the study phase, F(1, 71)
= 2.96, MSE = 0.012, p = 0.055, ηp2 = 0.041. There also was not a main effect of
location, F(1, 71) = 0.36, MSE = 0.008, p = 0.553, ηp2 = 0.005. Finally, the interaction of
attribute condition and location was also not significant, F(1, 71) = 0.03, MSE = 0.000, p
= 0.971, ηp2 = 0.000.
Response times
The same trimming procedure was also used for Experiment 4, resulting in 5.41
% of the response times being trimmed. The response time data were then submitted to a
3 x 2 mixed factorial ANOVA, with the within-subjects as the fan condition (one person
with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with one attribute) and
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with location (same or different) as the between-subjects factor. The means for both
groups are presented in Figure 7. As in the previous experiments, an alpha level of 0.05
was used and Bonferroni corrections were made for follow-up tests. The ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of fan on response times, F(1, 71) = 8.67, MSE =
168464.661, p = 0.000, ηp2 = 0.110. Paired t-tests revealed that the one person with one
attribute condition (M = 1425.73, SE = 46.09) had significantly faster response times than
the three people with one attribute condition (M = 1519.71, SE = 47.71), t(71) = 3.43, p =
0.003. The response times for the one person with three attributes condition (M =
1452.82, SE = 43.10) were also significantly faster than the three people with one
attribute condition, t(71) = 2.92, p = 0.014. In addition, as in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the
one person with one trait condition was not statistically different from the one person
with three attributes condition, t(71) = 1.42, p = 0.478. There was not a significant main
effect of location, F(1, 71) = 2.76, MSE = 1122992.112, p = 0.101, ηp2 = 0.942. Finally,
the interaction of attribute condition and location was also not significant, F(1, 71) =
1.80, MSE = 34864.737, p = 0.170, ηp2 = 0.25.
Error rates
Overall, the mean error rate in Experiment 4 was 2.1 %. The data were analyzed
with a 3 x 2 mixed factorial ANOVA, with the within-subjects factor as the fan condition
(one person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with one
attribute) and with location (same or different) as the between-subjects factor. The means
for both location groups are presented in Figure 8. There was no main effect of fan
condition, F(1, 72) = 0.71, MSE = 0.000, p = 0.495, ηp2 = 0.010 or location, F(1, 72) =
1.36, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.248, ηp2 = 0.019. Also, the interaction was not significant, F(1,
72) = 1.02, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.364, ηp2 = 0.014.
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Discussion
Experiment 4 produced a similar pattern to the other experiments with there
being a differential fan effect. Specifically, there was a fan effect observed for the three
people with one attribute condition, but not for the one person with three attributes
condition. The addition of locations during the study phase, in addition to the attributes
conflicting, was not enough to push participants in the different location group to
maintain separate situation model representations for the different attributes in the one
person with three attributes condition.
At this point, it appears that participants are inclined to organize around person
concepts. Across all four experiments, which all showed similar patterns, participants
were integrating information around a person, regardless of whether the attributes were
permanent (Experiment 1), situational but with the possibility of a plausible integration
(Experiment 2), or situational with no plausible integration (Experiments 3 and 4 (with
different location group)). It is possible that people will create a mental representation
centered around a person even if it violates their world knowledge of how attributes are
typically grouped.
The goal for Experiment 5 was to determine whether participants would organize
their mental representations around people when the attributes are abstract, internal, and
conflicting. To examine this, Experiment 5 used emotional states that are unlikely to be
experienced at one time. For example, “Patrick is repulsed,” “Patrick is happy,” and
“Patrick is upset” This experiment differed from the first four because it should be a lot
more difficult to create a mental representation of more than one emotional attributes,
thus, less likely that the attributes would be integrated. According to situation model
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theory, there should also be a fan effect for the one person with three attributes condition
because the attributes are difficult to integrate into one representation. According to the
ACT-R model, there should also be a fan effect for this condition because there are three
associated presented about one person. As in the earlier experiments, both situation
model theory and the ACT-R model would predict a fan effect for the three people with
one attribute condition.
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CHAPTER 8
EXPERIMENT 5
Method
Participants
A total of 36 participants (27 females, 9 males) with a mean age of 20.6 years
were recruited from the subject pool at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and
participants were issued research credit for their psychology course. The only restrictions
for participation were that one needed to be at least 18 years of age at the time of
participation and able to fluently speak and understand English. None of these individuals
participated in the previous four experiments.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure for Experiment 5 were similar to Experiments 1-3
except for one change. Here, the attributes referred to emotional states. The emotions
used for the one person with three attribute condition were derived from the six universal
emotions so that they clearly referred to different states. For example, “Laura is happy,”
“Laura is angry,” and “Laura is fearful.” The emotions for the remaining conditions were
synonyms or closely related to the six universal emotions, with half being positive and
half being negative.
Design and Analyses
Memory Response Times and Error Rates
As in the first three experiments, the response time and error rate data from the
speeded recognition test were each submitted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA
with three levels (one person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three
people with one attribute).
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Situation model theory predicted a fan effect for both fan 3 conditions because neither
condition corresponds to a situation where people can form an integrated situation model.
The ACT-R model predicts a fan effect for both conditions because there are multiple
associations related to a single concept. The sets of sentences used in Experiment 5 are
listed in Appendix A.
Results
Learning
Participants took an average of 5.72 (SE=0.27) study cycles to memorize the
sentences. As with the other experiments, the mean accuracy across study cycles was
computed for each condition. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the
means were significantly different F(1, 35) = 3.42, MSE = 0.012, p = 0.038, ηp2 = 0.089
(see Appendix B). Paired t-tests revealed that the one person with one attribute condition
was learned with more accuracy than the one person with three attributes condition, t(35)
= 2.67, p = 0.034. The accuracy for learning the sentences for the three people with one
attribute condition was not significantly different from the one person with three
attributes condition, t(35) = 1.06, p = 0.885, or the one person with one attribute
condition, t(35) = 1.67, p = 0.312.
Response times
The same trimming procedure that was used in the previous experiments was also
used in Experiment 5, resulting in 8.14 % of the response times being trimmed. The
response time data was then submitted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (one
person with one attribute, one person with three attributes, three people with one
attribute) and the means are presented in Figure 9. As in the other experiments, an alpha
of 0.05 was used and Bonferroni corrections were made for follow-up tests. The ANOVA
52

indicated that condition type had a significant effect on response times, F(1, 35) = 4.38,
MSE = 123692.378, p = 0.016, ηp2 = 0.111. Unlike the previous experiments, paired ttests revealed that the one person with one attribute condition (M = 1260.67, SE = 57.33)
had significantly faster response times than the one person with three attributes condition
(M = 1305.55, SE = 57.46), t(35) = 2.80, p = 0.025. The response times for the three
people with one attribute did not differ from the one person with three attributes
condition (M = 1322.19, SE = 55.57), t(35) = 0.74, p = 1.000, or the one person with one
attribute condition, t(35) = 1.98, p = 0.168.
Error rates
Overall, the mean error rate in Experiment 5 was 3.76 %. These data were
analyzed with a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (one person with one attribute, one
person with three attributes, three people with one attributes) and the means are presented
in Figure 10. The result was not significant, F(1, 35) = 0.43, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.653, ηp2
= 0.012.
Discussion
Experiment 5 investigated whether participants would form mental
representations when the attributes were conflicting emotions and a different pattern of
results was observed. Specifically, the response times for the one person with three
attributes condition were significantly slower than the one person with one attribute
condition. The fan effect for the one person with three attribute condition was a result that
both situation model theory and the ACT-R model predicted. Situation model theory
predicted this effect because it is based on the idea that people form mental
representations of the described state of affairs and it is difficult to visualize abstract
attributes that contradict. ACT-R model would predict this finding because multiple
53

associations are associated with one attribute. However, the lack of a fan effect for the
three people with one attribute condition was rather surprising. Based on the state of
affairs explanation for situation model theory, a fan effect was expected for this condition
because, as in Experiments 1 through 4, people were not expected to integrate three
people into one representation. However, to date, fan effects have not been studied with
abstract entities. Although, ACT-R model would predict a fan effect, Anderson and
Reder might say that participants were attending more to the names because they are
more concrete (see Anderson & Reder, 1999).
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CHAPTER 9
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Five experiments were conducted to investigate whether fan effects would be
observed for attributes that could potentially be organized around people. Previous
research has shown that people can organize around person concepts, but that it does not
always occur. For instance, a person-based organization was observed when the material
included small spaces, but not large (Radvansky et al., 1993). A person-based
organization was also observed in situations where people were buying objects that could
be purchased in one location, but not when the objects either could not be purchased in
the same location or when the sentences described situations where people already owned
the objects (Radvansky et al., 1997). Given the results of previous studies, I predicted that
people would organize the attributes around the person, thus producing a differential fan
in cases where the traits were permanent, but not when they were situational, especially
when the attributes were conflicting.
The first three experiments tested the organization of three different attributes:
permanent, situational, and situational attributes that were conflicting. According to
situation model theory, when a set of sentences refer to a static event, integration of the
facts should be observed. This was observed with permanent attributes (Experiment 1)
and situational attributes that could plausibly refer to a single, static event (Experiment
2). While I did not originally predict this outcome for situational attributes, in retrospect,
this pattern can be consistent with the Radvansky et al. (1997) findings because
participants may have interpreted the sentences as referring to a common situation.
However, the same pattern of integration was also observed with conflicting situational
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attributes (Experiment 3), which does not support that explanation for situation model
theory.
Because Radvansky et al. (1993) showed that participants can use both people and
locations as the focus of integration, Experiment 4 tested the inclusion of locations with
conflicting traits. Different locations were used to encourage participants to interpret the
information as referring to separate situations by giving participants different spatialtemporal frameworks in which to organize their mental representations. Regardless of
whether different or same locations were used, Experiment 4 produced the same pattern
of results as the first three experiments, and locations did not appear to influence situation
model organization. It is important to note, though, that people may not have attended to
locations because they were not asked questions about locations during the study phase.
Sohn et al. (2004) found that attention can influence the fan effect, however those results
were in the opposite direction, with the greater amount of attention producing a larger fan
effect.
So, if that explanation of situation model theory cannot account for the results, is
it still possible for the theory to explain these outcomes? One difference between this
thesis and other studies is that I used attributes which could possibly be more inherently
related to person concepts. Other studies have not exclusively included objects that can
be worn or can be a part of someone. Therefore, the integration of attributes can fit in
with the Gestalt laws of grouping (Köhler, 1920). In particular the results fit in with the
law of proximity when an individual perceives objects that are close together as forming
a group. This law refers to items that are presented visually, but in this thesis, the
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participants could have mentally represented the objects as being close together because
they were associated with the same body part.
Similar to this idea, it might be tempting to conclude that participants
misinterpreted the sentences used in the current experiments. That is, rather than
interpreting the sentences as they were written (i.e., “is wearing an attribute”), it is
possible that participants interpreted them to mean “owns an attribute.” In the latter
scenario, it is intuitive to imagine that participants could integrate the “owned attributes”
into a single representation; however, Radvansky et al. (1997) showed that participants
do not integrate information when ownership is described because it does not refer to a
specific situation. Alternatively, future research could examine the “owns an attribute”
phrasing with conflicting attributes such as, “Robin owns flippers,” “Robin owns ice
skates,” and “Robin owns high heels.” Owning these objects that are all associated with
the same body part could possibly lead to integration.
Another explanation for the pattern of results is that, despite the attributes
conflicting, people continued to integrate them into a single, bizarre, representation. In
this case, there may have been a contribution of the von Restorff effect (1933), which
predicts that distinct items are remembered better than other items. It is possible that the
unusualness of a situation where one person is wearing items of clothes that do not
usually occur together boosted the integration of those items. This is related to a study
conducted by McDaniel and Einstein (1986) where bizarreness was manipulated by the
relations of word triplets such as, “The dog rode the bicycle down the street.” This was
compared to common images such as, “The dog chased the bicycle down the street.”
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Participants were slower to form bizarre images compared to common images, but recall
was higher for bizarre images.
Another possibility is the explanation that was offered by Radvansky et al. (1993)
to account for the integration of information around people when using small locations
(e.g., phone booth, witness stand, etc.). Here, Radvansky et al. described the integration
as occurring around a course of events that were linked through a common person
(Barwise & Perry, 1983). A course of events is thought to be a situation type that can
include a series of events, with a common thread, that do not need to occur in the same
location. Thus, integration happens because the events are so highly related despite the
non-static nature of those events. However, this idea does not seem to be consistent with
some other findings related to the fan effect. For example, Radvansky et al. (1998)
showed that participants did not integrate actions performed by the same person unless
those actions could occur simultaneously. Also, it is not clear how an integrated course of
events could be perceptually represented as a single situation. Granted, situation models
do not have to be linked to perceptual representations (e.g., Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998),
but they often are linked to them (e.g., Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002).
One intriguing finding from the current set of experiments was that in Experiment
5, when conflicting emotional states were used, the results showed a different pattern;
specifically, the results did not show evidence of integration in the one person with three
attributes condition. Interestingly, participants organized around the emotional attributes.
A fan effect was not expected for this condition, considering it was not found in the
previous four experiments, but this finding shows how inclined people are to integrate
information in long-term memory. It also demonstrates that the concept that integration is
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centered around does not have to be a dimension of the situation model that is found in
research with narrative comprehension. That is, unlike character / entity and spatial
location, emotion is not classified as a unique situation model dimension. Future research
could examine whether emotion should be classified as a situation dimension and
whether there is a hierarchy of situation dimensions that people use to determine what
should be the focus of their organization.
According to the ACT-R model, the more facts associated with a concept, the
weaker the strength of associations which results in less activation of items with more
fans. Across all of the experiments, the predictions of the ACT-R model were not
consistently supported because a differential fan effect was always observed.
Specifically, because the focus of attention and frequency of materials was consistent
across conditions at encoding and retrieval, there was no a priori reason to expect
different weights for different concepts. Thus, the model would have not predicted the
differential fan effects.
The only reasonable way to fit the current results into the ACT-R model would be
to assume, post-hoc, that some concepts were weighted higher than others. Anderson and
Reder (1999) claimed that concrete items could receive more weight than items that are
not concrete. However, first names are more arbitrary and abstract than the attributes
used in Experiments 1-4, but a differential fan effect was still observed. In Experiment 5,
the first names were probably more concrete than emotional states but a differential fan
effect was observed for emotions. Anderson and Reder (1999) also argued that concepts
that have multiple words could result in more weighting because there are more cues at
retrieval. There were incidents where multiple words were used in the current set of
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experiments (e.g., emerald green eyes) but participants still organized around the personconcept. Finally, it is also possible that participants were biased to organize around
people because people always came first in the sentences; however, this does not seem to
be a likely explanation because in Radvansky et al.’s (1993) experiments, locations
appeared last in the sentences, yet people organized their representations around those.
One thing that is clear is that neither the ACT-R model nor situation model theory
can adequately explain all the findings from this set of experiments. The ACT-R model
could possibly be used to explain the results if fan effects were consistently observed for
each condition, but it does not do a good job at supporting the differential fan effects.
Situation model theory can explain the differential fan effects in Experiments 1 and 2, but
cannot easily explain the findings in Experiments 3-5 because, in those cases, there were
conditions in which an integrated situation model would be implausible and separate
situation models should have been constructed. It is possible that the fan effect paradigm
itself needs to be investigated more deeply. The majority of studies have focused on
changing the materials to get different effects, but only a small number of studies have
manipulated the procedure. Perhaps, the procedure itself is not indicative of how memory
is really organized. For example, the study phase involves asking questions that group the
items related to the same concept together (e.g., “What emotions are Mary feeling?”). It
is possible that this forces people to think about the items as a group too much, which in
turn can cause interference or integration. The testing procedure was manipulated in one
prior study by having people verify whether the sentence was plausible and reversed fan
effects were found (Reder & Ross, 1983). Therefore, the fan effect paradigm itself might
cause artificial representations in memory and should be investigated in future studies.
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CHAPTER 10
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
One of the limitations of this thesis may lie in pre-experimental associations with
grouping of the attributes. Due to the nature of the attributes, and the fact that some
attributes were specifically matched together because they contradicted, the material was
not as random as in other fan effect studies where almost every participant would get a
different set of materials (e.g., Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). In contrast, this thesis only
had four different versions of the sentences that were counterbalanced across participants.
However, this could only be a limitation in Experiments 1 and 2, because the materials in
the other experiments, while still not being as random as other studies, were
combinations that are highly unlikely to occur together in real life.
Another potential limitation was the use of real names instead of occupation titles.
Previous fan effect studies investigating people have used occupation titles, however,
because I was looking at physical attributes in most of the experiments, I did not want the
occupation titles to elicit schemas of physical descriptions. It is possible that I could have
observed less integration if I used occupation titles because people would not need the
physical attribute descriptions to create a mental representation of the person, thus they
may have been less likely to integrate more information. Related to this idea, the use of
first names could have cued participants to think about individuals whom they know and
then they could have integrated the extra attributes. This would be consistent with studies
that found that memorizing false facts about familiar people increases memory recall
(e.g., Kole & Healy, 2010).
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Future experiments should continue to investigate why people will form an
integrated situation model with conflicting materials. This could be investigated in a few
ways. First, the bizarreness effect could be examined by including combinations that are
bizarre in the one person with three attribute conditions along with combinations that are
more likely to occur in everyday life, such as the ones that were presented in Experiment
2. If people form integrated models for the bizarre pairings, but not the normal pairings,
then it would show that the integration only occurs because of the bizarreness enhancing
the items. Also, if the bizarre items referred to attributes that correspond to different body
parts and they still elicit a differential fan than this could rule out the possibility of the
results being due to a Gestalt effect (Köhler, 1920). Another route to examine the
bizarreness effect would be to include conflicting permanent traits in the material set
which are even less likely to occur in real life (blue eyes, green eyes, brown eyes), rather
than conflicting situational traits.
Future experiments could also continue to study attribute pairings with people in
conjunction with other situational dimensions (e.g., location, goals, time, etc.). For
example, the possibility of locations being ignored during Experiment 4 could be
examined further by including questions during the study phase about locations.
However, this could potentially be too difficult for participants to have to answer
questions about locations, people, and attributes (i.e., this would noticeably increase the
duration of the experiment, which could lead to fatigue). For the time dimension,
performance could be examined by including attributes that occur through different
phases in the life cycle (e.g., “Scott has oily pimples,” “Scott has a receding hair line,”
and “Scott has aging wrinkles.”). If these types of materials produced a fan effect, then it
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would indicate that the inclusion of time shifts can stop integration from occurring
around the person, and it would also be consistent with the Radvansky et al. (1997)
studies. However, this could be taken a step farther by also including the possibility of a
course of events spread across time shifts by focusing on differences within a single
attribute (e.g., “Scott has thick hair,” “Scott has receding hair,” and “Scott is bald.”). If
materials that describe a course of events can produce integration then it would prove that
course of events integration can happen in the fan effect paradigm.
As stated earlier, the patterns observed across five experiments did not fit
perfectly with the predictions of the ACT-R model or situation model theory. Any, or all,
of the possibilities described above could be explored to gain a better understanding of
how participants are organizing information about people and attributes. These
possibilities should be explored so that the fan effect can be more fully understood.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION
In summary, this thesis demonstrated further support that the integration of
information occurs differentially in the fan effect paradigm. The integration occurred
when attributes were permanent, situational, and even when they conflicted or involved
different locations. However, when the attributes were internal (i.e., emotions),
integration occurred around the attribute rather than the person. The basic integration
patterns for permanent and plausible situational traits fit into predictions made by
situation model theory, but the other findings do not easily fit into the explanations made
by that theory. The findings observed in this thesis suggest that people will find a way to
integrate information, despite how implausible the situation may be, but the concept
chosen to integrate around can differ depending on the materials used.
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APPENDIX A
Complete sets of sentences for Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
Experiment 1: Permanent Attributes
Version 1
One Person with One Attribute
Carrie has two deep dimples
Austin has a broad forehead
Gabby has big floppy ears
Bradley has a tribal tattoo
Holly has a crooked nose
George has two hairy moles
One Person with Three Attributes
Jenna has rosy red cheeks
Jenna has shiny brown hair
Jenna has emerald green eyes
Kevin has a defined cleft chin
Kevin has a jagged scar
Kevin has pasty pale skin
Three People with One Attribute
Patrick has deep line wrinkles
Randy has deep line wrinkles
Thomas has deep line wrinkles
Laura has very tan skin
Marie has very tan skin
Nancy has very tan skin
Version 2
One Person with One Attribute
Laura has two hairy moles
Marie has a defined cleft chin
Nancy has shiny brown hair
Randy has pasty pale skin
Thomas has a jagged scar
Bradley has deep line wrinkles
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One Person with Three Attributes
Gabby has a broad forehead
Gabby has big floppy ears
Gabby has two deep dimples
Austin has very tan skin
Austin has a tribal tattoo
Austin has a crooked nose
Three People with One Attribute
George has rosy red cheeks
Kevin has rosy red cheeks
Patrick has rosy red cheeks
Carrie has emerald green eyes
Holly has emerald green eyes
Jenna has emerald green eyes
Version 3
One Person with One Attribute
Nancy has emerald green eyes
Laura has a tribal tattoo
Jenna has very tan skin
Randy has shiny brown hair
Austin has a jagged scar
Kevin has a broad forehead
One Person with Three Attributes
Holly has two hairy moles
Holly has deep line wrinkles
Holly has pasty pale skin
Patrick has two deep dimples
Patrick has big floppy ears
Patrick has rosy red cheeks
Three People with One Attribute
George has a defined cleft chin
Thomas has a defined cleft chin
Bradley has a defined cleft chin
Gabby has a crooked nose
Carrie has a crooked nose
Marie has a crooked nose
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Version 4
One Person with One Attribute
Jenna has very tan skin
Nancy has two deep dimples
Carrie has a broad forehead
Kevin has deep line wrinkles
Patrick has a jagged scar
Randy a defined cleft chin
One Person with Three Attributes
Laura has pasty pale skin
Laura has a crooked nose
Laura has shiny brown hair
George has rosy red cheeks
George has emerald green eyes
George has two hairy moles
Three People with One Attribute
Bradley has a tribal tattoo
Thomas has a tribal tattoo
Austin has a tribal tattoo
Marie has big floppy ears
Holly has big floppy ears
Gabby has big floppy ears
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Experiment 2 –Situational Attributes (Non-conflicting)
Version 1
One Person with One Attribute
Laura is wearing orange rain boots
Marie is wearing combat boots
Nancy is wearing cowboy boots
Randy is wearing khaki pants
Thomas is wearing a thick vest
Bradley is wearing a polo shirt
One Person with Three Attributes
Jenna is wearing a blue beanie
Jenna is wearing sunglasses
Jenna is wearing tight yoga pants
Kevin is wearing a beer helmet
Kevin is wearing a red hoodie
Kevin is wearing a stopwatch
Three People with One Attribute
Patrick is wearing safety goggles
Randy is wearing safety goggles
Thomas is wearing safety goggles
Laura is wearing a sweater
Marie is wearing a sweater
Nancy is wearing a sweater
Version 2
One Person with One Attribute
Laura is wearing a beer helmet
Marie is wearing orange rain boots
Nancy is wearing tight yoga pants
Randy is wearing a sweater
Thomas is wearing a red hoodie
Bradley is wearing a blue beanie
One Person with Three Attributes
Gabby is wearing safety goggles
Gabby is wearing khaki pants
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Gabby is wearing a thick vest
Austin is wearing a polo shirt
Austin is wearing sunglasses
Austin is wearing cowboy boots
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing combat boots
Kevin is wearing combat boots
Patrick is wearing combat boots
Carrie is wearing a stopwatch
Holly is wearing a stopwatch
Jenna is wearing a stopwatch
Version 3
One Person with One Attribute
Nancy is wearing a blue beanie
Laura is wearing tight yoga pants
Jenna is wearing cowboy boots
Randy is wearing a polo shirt
Austin is wearing sunglasses
Kevin is wearing safety goggles
One Person with Three Attributes
Holly is wearing a sweater
Holly is wearing combat boots
Holly is wearing a stopwatch
Patrick is wearing a thick vest
Patrick is wearing a beer helmet
Patrick is wearing orange rain boots
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing khaki pants
Thomas is wearing khaki pants
Bradley is wearing khaki pants
Gabby is wearing a red hoodie
Carrie is wearing a red hoodie
Marie is wearing a red hoodie
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Version 4
One Person with One Attribute
Jenna is wearing safety goggles
Nancy is wearing cowboy boots
Carrie is wearing a tight yoga pants
Kevin is wearing orange rainboots
Patrick is wearing a thick vest
Randy is wearing a stopwatch
One Person with Three Attributes
Laura is wearing khaki pants
Laura is wearing a red hoodie
Laura is wearing sunglasses
George is wearing a blue beanie
George is wearing a sweater
George is wearing combat boots
Three People with One Attribute
Bradley is wearing a polo shirt
Thomas is wearing a polo shirt
Austin is wearing a polo shirt
Marie is wearing a beer helmet
Holly is wearing a beer helmet
Gabby is wearing a beer helmet
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Experiment 3 – Situational Attributes (Conflicting)
Version 1
One Person with One Attribute
Carrie is wearing cowboy boots
Austin is wearing a striped tie
Gabby is wearing combat boots
Bradley is wearing orange rain boots
Holly is wearing a lab coat
George is wearing a trench coat
One Person with Three Attributes
Jenna is wearing a gas mask
Jenna is wearing a hockey mask
Jenna is wearing sunglasses
Kevin is wearing a beer helmet
Kevin is wearing a silk top hat
Kevin is wearing a cowboy hat
Three People with One Attribute
Patrick is wearing a neck brace
Randy is wearing a neck brace
Thomas is wearing a neck brace
Laura is wearing a varsity jacket
Marie is wearing a varsity jacket
Nancy is wearing a varsity jacket
Version 2
One Person with One Attribute
Laura is wearing a beer helmet
Marie is wearing a silk top hat
Nancy is wearing a cowboy hat
Randy is wearing a hockey mask
Thomas is wearing a gas mask
Bradley is wearing a neck brace
One Person with Three Attributes
Gabby is wearing orange rain boots
Gabby is wearing cowboy boots
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Gabby is wearing combat boots
Austin is wearing a trench coat
Austin is wearing a lab coat
Austin is wearing a varsity jacket
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing a striped tie
Kevin is wearing a striped tie
Patrick is wearing a striped tie
Carrie is wearing sunglasses
Holly is wearing sunglasses
Jenna is wearing sunglasses
Version 3
One Person with One Attribute
Nancy is wearing a neck brace
Laura is wearing a trench coat
Jenna is wearing cowboy boots
Randy is wearing a varsity jacket
Austin is wearing a striped tie
Kevin is wearing orange rain boots
One Person with Three Attributes
Holly is wearing a beer helmet
Holly is wearing a silk top hat
Holly is wearing a cowboy hat
Patrick is wearing a gas mask
Patrick is wearing a hockey mask
Patrick is wearing sunglasses
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing combat boots
Thomas is wearing combat boots
Bradley is wearing combat boots
Gabby is wearing a lab coat
Carrie is wearing a lab coat
Marie is wearing a lab coat
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Version 4
One Person with One Attribute
Jenna is wearing a gas mask
Nancy is wearing sunglasses
Carrie is wearing a beer helmet
Kevin is wearing a striped tie
Patrick is wearing a neck brace
Randy is wearing a silk top hat
One Person with Three Attributes
Laura is wearing a trench coat
Laura is wearing a lab coat
Laura is wearing a varsity jacket
George is wearing orange rainboots
George is wearing cowboy boots
George is wearing combat boots
Three People with One Attribute
Bradley is wearing a hockey mask
Thomas is wearing a hockey mask
Austin is wearing a hockey mask
Marie is wearing a cowboy hat
Holly is wearing a cowboy hat
Gabby is wearing a cowboy hat
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Experiment 4 – Conflicting Attributes with Locations
Different Locations
Version 1
One Person with One Attribute
Carrie is wearing cowboy boots at the laboratory
Austin is wearing a striped tie at the office
Gabby is wearing combat boots at the theater
Bradley is wearing orange rain boots at the bakery
Holly is wearing a lab coat at the school
George is wearing a trench coat at the city hall
One Person with Three Attributes
Jenna is wearing an eye patch at the factory
Jenna is wearing a hockey mask at the bar
Jenna is wearing sunglasses at the park
Kevin is wearing a beer helmet at the garage
Kevin is wearing a silk top hat at the hotel
Kevin is wearing a cowboy hat at the bank
Three People with One Attribute
Patrick is wearing a neck brace at the museum
Randy is wearing a neck brace at the airport
Thomas is wearing a neck brace at the diner
Laura is wearing a mink fur coat at the library
Marie is wearing a mink fur coat at the café
Nancy is wearing a mink fur coat at the mall
Version 2
One Person with One Attribute
Laura is wearing a beer helmet at the laboratory
Marie is wearing a silk top hat at the library
Nancy is wearing a cowboy hat at the bakery
Randy is wearing a hockey mask at the café
Thomas is wearing an eye patch at the airport
Bradley is wearing a neck brace at the office
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One Person with Three Attributes
Gabby is wearing orange rain boots at the mall
Gabby is wearing cowboy boots at the diner
Gabby is wearing combat boots at the garage
Austin is wearing a trench coat at the park
Austin is wearing a lab coat at the factory
Austin is wearing a mink fur coat at the museum
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing a striped tie at the city hall
Kevin is wearing a striped tie at the bank
Patrick is wearing a striped tie at the theater
Carrie is wearing sunglasses at the hotel
Holly is wearing sunglasses at the bar
Jenna is wearing sunglasses at the school
Version 3
One Person with One Attribute
Nancy is wearing a neck brace at the bakery
Laura is wearing a trench coat at the theater
Jenna is wearing cowboy boots at the airport
Randy is wearing a mink fur coat at the diner
Austin is wearing a striped tie at the museum
Kevin is wearing orange rain boots at the bank
One Person with Three Attributes
Holly is wearing a beer helmet at the hotel
Holly is wearing a silk top hat at the bar
Holly is wearing a cowboy hat at the mall
Patrick is wearing an eye patch at the laboratory
Patrick is wearing a hockey mask at the garage
Patrick is wearing sunglasses at the factory
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing combat boots at the café
Thomas is wearing combat boots at the city hall
Bradley is wearing combat boots at the park
Gabby is wearing a lab coat the school
Carrie is wearing a lab coat at the office
Marie is wearing a lab coat at the library
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Version 4
One Person with One Attribute
Jenna is wearing an eye patch at the museum
Nancy is wearing sunglasses at the bakery
Carrie is wearing a beer helmet at the hotel
Kevin is wearing a striped tie at the laboratory
Patrick is wearing a neck brace at the office
Randy is wearing a silk top hat at the theater
One Person with Three Attributes
Laura is wearing a trench coat at the café
Laura is wearing a lab coat at the factory
Laura is wearing a mink fur coat at the city hall
George is wearing orange rain boots at the park
George is wearing cowboy boots at the bank
George is wearing combat boots at the library
Three People with One Attribute
Bradley is wearing a hockey mask at the school
Thomas is wearing a hockey mask at the mall
Austin is wearing a hockey mask at the bar
Marie is wearing a cowboy hat at the garage
Holly is wearing a cowboy hat at the airport
Gabby is wearing a cowboy hat at the diner
Same Locations
Version 1
One Person with One Attribute
Carrie is wearing cowboy boots at the laboratory
Austin is wearing a striped tie at the office
Gabby is wearing combat boots at the theater
Bradley is wearing orange rain boots at the bakery
Holly is wearing a lab coat at the school
George is wearing a trench coat at the city hall
One Person with Three Attributes
Jenna is wearing an eye patch at the factory
Jenna is wearing a hockey mask at the factory
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Jenna is wearing sunglasses at the factory
Kevin is wearing a beer helmet at the hotel
Kevin is wearing a silk top hat at the hotel
Kevin is wearing a cowboy hat at the hotel
Three People with One Attribute
Patrick is wearing a neck brace at the museum
Randy is wearing a neck brace at the museum
Thomas is wearing a neck brace at the museum
Laura is wearing a mink fur coat at the mall
Marie is wearing a mink fur coat at the mall
Nancy is wearing a mink fur coat at the mall
Version 2
One Person with One Attribute
Laura is wearing a beer helmet at the laboratory
Marie is wearing a silk top hat at the library
Nancy is wearing a cowboy hat at the park
Randy is wearing a hockey mask at the café
Thomas is wearing an eye patch at the airport
Bradley is wearing a neck brace at the office
One Person with Three Attributes
Gabby is wearing orange rain boots at the diner
Gabby is wearing cowboy boots at the diner
Gabby is wearing combat boots at the diner
Austin is wearing a trench coat at the bakery
Austin is wearing a lab coat at the bakery
Austin is wearing a mink fur coat at the bakery
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing a striped tie at the bank
Kevin is wearing a striped tie at the bank
Patrick is wearing a striped tie at the bank
Carrie is wearing sunglasses at the bar
Holly is wearing sunglasses at the bar
Jenna is wearing sunglasses at the bar
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Version 3
One Person with One Attribute
Nancy is wearing a neck brace at the bakery
Laura is wearing a trench coat at the theater
Jenna is wearing cowboy boots at the airport
Randy is wearing a mink fur coat at the diner
Austin is wearing a striped tie at the museum
Kevin is wearing orange rain boots at the bank
One Person with Three Attributes
Holly is wearing a beer helmet at the garage
Holly is wearing a silk top hat at the garage
Holly is wearing a cowboy hat at the garage
Patrick is wearing an eye patch at the laboratory
Patrick is wearing a hockey mask at the laboratory
Patrick is wearing sunglasses at the laboratory
Three People with One Attribute
George is wearing combat boots at the café
Thomas is wearing combat boots at the café
Bradley is wearing combat boots at the café
Gabby is wearing a lab coat the school
Carrie is wearing a lab coat at the school
Marie is wearing a lab coat at the school
Version 4
One Person with One Attribute
Jenna is wearing an eye patch at the museum
Nancy is wearing sunglasses at the bakery
Carrie is wearing a beer helmet at the hotel
Kevin is wearing a striped tie at the laboratory
Patrick is wearing a neck brace at the office
Randy is wearing a silk top hat at the theater
One Person with Three Attributes
Laura is wearing a trench coat at the city hall
Laura is wearing a lab coat at the city hall
Laura is wearing a mink fur coat at the city hall
George is wearing orange rain boots at the library
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George is wearing cowboy boots at the library
George is wearing combat boots at the library
Three People with One Attribute
Bradley is wearing a hockey mask at the park
Thomas is wearing a hockey mask at the park
Austin is wearing a hockey mask at the park
Marie is wearing a cowboy hat at the airport
Holly is wearing a cowboy hat at the airport
Gabby is wearing a cowboy hat at the airport
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Experiment 5- Emotional Attributes
Version 1
One Person with One Attribute
Carrie is anxious
Austin is eager
Gabby is confused
Bradley is content
Holly is aroused
George is annoyed
One Person with Three Attributes
Jenna is angry
Jenna is surprised
Jenna is fearful
Kevin is upset
Kevin is happy
Kevin is repulsed
Three People with One Attribute
Patrick is nervous
Randy is nervous
Thomas is nervous
Laura is relaxed
Marie is relaxed
Nancy is relaxed
Version 2
One Person with One Attribute
Laura is confused
Marie is content
Nancy is annoyed
Randy is relaxed
Thomas is nervous
Bradley is aroused
One Person with Three Attributes
Gabby is upset
Gabby is happy
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Gabby is fearful
Austin is angry
Austin is repulsed
Austin is surprised
Three People with One Attribute
George is eager
Kevin is eager
Patrick is eager
Carrie is anxious
Holly is anxious
Jenna is anxious
Version 3
One Person with One Attribute
Nancy is nervous
Laura is eager
Jenna is relaxed
Randy is annoyed
Austin is aroused
Kevin is anxious
One Person with Three Attributes
Holly is surprised
Holly is happy
Holly is repulsed
Patrick is upset
Patrick is fearful
Patrick is angry
Three People with One Attribute
George is confused
Thomas is confused
Bradley is confused
Gabby is content
Carrie is content
Marie is content
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Version 4
One Person with One Attribute
Jenna is relaxed
Nancy is eager
Carrie is confused
Kevin is content
Patrick is anxious
Randy is nervous
One Person with Three Attributes
Laura is happy
Laura is angry
Laura is fearful
George is surprised
George is upset
George is repulsed
Three People with One Attribute
Bradley is aroused
Thomas is aroused
Austin is aroused
Marie is annoyed
Holly is annoyed
Gabby is annoyed
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APPENDIX B
Table 1
Mean scores from study cycles for Experiments 1-5
One person

One person

Three people

with 1 attribute

with 3 attributes

With 1 attribute

M

M

M

Exp. 1: Permanent Attributes

75.5%

76.3%

77.8%

Exp. 2: Temporary Attributes

74.7%

77.1%

77.3%

Exp 3: Conflicting Attributes

92.1%

76.7%

76.0%

Exp. 4: Locations – Same

74.5%

76.9%

75.7%

75.7%

79.7%

74.1%

75.9%

Condition

Exp. 4: Locations – Different
Exp. 5: Emotions

73.0%
77.8%
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APPENDIX C: FIGURES
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Fan 1 (one person with Fan 3 (one person with Fan 3 (three people
one attribute)
three attributes)
with one attribute)

Figure 1. Mean response times (ms) for the one person with one trait, one person with
three traits, and three people with one trait conditions in Experiment 1. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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Figure 2. Mean error rates for the one person with one attribute, one person with three
attributes, and three people with one attribute conditions in Experiment 1. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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one attribute)
three attributes)
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Figure 3. Mean response times (ms) for the one person with one trait, one person with
three traits, and three people with one trait conditions in Experiment 2. The error bars
reflect standard error
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Figure 4. Mean error rates for the one person with one attribute, one person with three
attributes, and three people with one attribute conditions in Experiment 2. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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Figure 5. Mean response times (ms) for the one person with one trait, one person with
three traits, and three people with one trait conditions in Experiment 3. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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Figure 6. Mean error rates for the one person with one attribute, one person with three
attributes, and three people with one attribute conditions in Experiment 3. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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Figure 7. Mean response times (ms) for the one person with one trait, one person with
three traits, and three people with one trait conditions in Experiment 4. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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Figure 8. Mean error rates for the one person with one attribute, one person with three
attributes, and three people with one attribute conditions in Experiment 4. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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Figure 9. Mean response times (ms) for the one person with one trait, one person with
three traits, and three people with one trait conditions in Experiment 5. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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Figure 10 . Mean error rates for the one person with one attribute, one person with three
attributes, and three people with one attribute conditions in Experiment 5. The error bars
reflect standard error.
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